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Abstract 
This paper investigates the long-run effects of average revenue regulation on   
an electricity transmission monopolist who applies a two-part tariff comprising a variable 
congestion  price  and  a  non-negative  fixed  access  fee.    A  binding  constraint  on  the 
monopolist’s  expected  average  revenue  lowers  the  access  fee,  promotes  transmission 
investment, and improves consumer surplus.    In a case of any linear or log-linear electricity 
demand  function  with  a  positive  probability  that  no  congestion  occurs,  average  revenue 
regulation is allocatively more efficient than a Coasian two-part tariff if a positive access fee 













JEL Classification Number: L51   
Keywords: congestion pricing; electric power transmission; two-part tariff; average revenue 
  regulation; Coasian two-part tariff 
Correspondence: Isamu Matsukawa, Professor 
Faculty of Economics, Musashi University 
                        1-26-1 Toyotama-kami, Nerima-ku, Tokyo 176-8534, Japan. 
                            Phone: +81-3-5984-3769, Fax: +81-3-3991-1198 
                        E-mail: matukawa@cc.musashi.ac.jp       
    
1. INTRODUCTION 
Congestion pricing has been applied to bulk power markets in order to achieve   
efficient rationing of access to constrained electric networks.    Examples include the capacity 
elements of Statnett’s transmission tariffs in Norway and locational marginal pricing in the 
PJM  Interconnection  in  the  United  States.    Congestion  pricing,  which  sets  transmission 
prices  equal  to  nodal  price  differences  between  regions  sending  and  receiving  electricity 
respectively, is expected to achieve short-run economic efficiency in competitive electricity 
markets.    That is because nodal prices are consistent with marginal cost pricing of electricity 
and interregional differences in nodal prices reflect marginal costs of transmission (Hogan, 
1992; Chao and Peck, 1996; Stoft, 2002).     
Congestion pricing also leads to long-run efficiency if a congestion price reflects 
the marginal benefit of capacity expansion and transmission capacity is expanded to the point 
where  the  unit  price  of  congestion  is  equal  to  the  marginal  cost  of  capacity.
1    If  the 
transmission sector exhibits constant returns to scale technology, revenue from congestion 
pricing alone exactly covers expenses of capacity expansion so that a transmission company 
has an incentive to expand its congested networks (Vickrey, 1971; FERC, 1989, pp.96-97).     
For a transmission company with increasing returns to scale technology, however, 
an additional source of revenue is necessary to finance the expansion of its network capacity.   
Cost functions of transmission investment have been found to exhibit scale economies over 
the relevant range of transmission capacity (Baldick and Kahn, 1993).    Thus, revenue from    
congestion pricing is insufficient for a proper expansion of transmission capacity in the case 
of increasing returns to scale technology.    In fact, transmission lines that have been built in 
anticipation of recovering their costs entirely by the revenue from congestion pricing do not 
appear to be profitable in Australia (Joskow and Tirole, 2003, p.7).                   
              Based on the idea that capacity expansion is financed by a combination of the 
revenue  from  congestion  pricing  and  that  from  the  fixed  access  fee,  Vogelsang  (2001) 
investigated  the  price-cap  regulation  of  access  to  transmission  networks  that  exhibit 
increasing returns to scale.    Given the number of users of transmission networks, Vogelsang 
(2001) examined properties of several forms of price-cap regulation with a two-part tariff, 
which consists of (i) a variable congestion price that is endogenously determined by a spot 
market of electricity, and (ii) a strictly positive fixed fee for the access to the transmission 
facility owned and operated by a profit-maximizing transmission monopolist subject to the 
price-cap regulation.             
This paper investigates how average revenue regulation on the transmission 
monopolist affects its investment and pricing in the long run, using a static model that allows 
the number of generators to be determined endogenously and that allows the access fee to be 
zero.
2    Average revenue regulation, which has been applied to such industries as airports, 
gas and electricity in the United Kingdom (Cowan, 1997), has an informational advantage 
over Vogelsang’s mechanism of the price-cap regulation that requires the regulator to obtain 
precise information on the weights used for the price index.    The endogeneity of the number    
of users is crucial in the analysis of the monopolist’s choice of transmission capacity because 
a relatively high access fee that is needed to cover a large amount of the fixed costs in 
transmission investment is expected to reduce the number of users of the transmission facility, 
thereby discouraging the expansion of transmission capacity in the long run.    Zero access 
fees  may  be  optimal  for  the  transmission  monopolist  if  a  binding  constraint  on  the 
transmission network results in revenue from congestion pricing that is sufficient to cover 
investment costs.    The optimality of a zero access fee, which indicates the superiority of a 
uniform  price  over  a  two-part tariff,  is  consistent  with  Ordover  and  Panzar (1982),  who 
argued that for the input required in a fixed proportion to the output such as electric power 
transmission, a two-part tariff is inferior to a uniform price from either a welfare or monopoly 
profit-maximizing standpoint.             
This paper also makes a welfare comparison of a two-part tariff under average 
revenue regulation with a Coasian two-part tariff (Coase, 1946; Brown and Sibley, 1986, 
pp.66-67).
3    For social welfare to be maximized under a zero-profit constraint, a Coasian 
two-part tariff in which the unit price is set equal to marginal cost and all profits are extracted 
via  the  access  fee  appears  to  be  an  optimal  method  of  regulating  a  transmission  tariff.   
However, a Coasian two-part tariff may be less efficient than a two-part tariff under average 
revenue  regulation  if  a  relatively  high  access  fee  under  the  Coasian  two-part  tariff 
significantly  reduces  the  number  of  users  of  the  transmission  facility  in  comparison  to 
average  revenue  regulation.      The  paper  shows  that  in  case  of  any  linear  or  log-linear    
demand function of electricity with a strictly positive probability that no congestion occurs, 
average revenue regulation is allocatively more efficient than a Coasian two-part tariff if a 
positive  access fee  under  average  revenue  regulation  is  lower  than  that  under  a  Coasian 
two-part tariff. 
How to regulate a transmission monopolist has been an important policy issue in 
electricity markets.    The literature investigates the regulatory mechanisms of pricing access 
to  the  transmission  facility  (Einhorn,  1990;  Hogendorn,  2003),  the  proper  expansion  of 
transmission facilities (Baldick and Khan, 1993; Bushnell and Stoft, 1996, 1997; Leautier, 
2000; Saphores et al., 2004), and the governance of the transmission monopolist (Kleindorfer, 
1998; Boyce and Hollis, 2005).    The model of this paper has several features that are also 
found  in  those  of  the  previous  literature:  a  stochastic  demand  for  transmission,  scale 
economies  in  transmission  investment,  an  independent  transmission  company  which  is 
subject to regulation, and the presence of competitive spot markets of electricity.
 4, 5    The 
long-run  effects  and  welfare  properties  of  average  revenue  regulation  in  electric  power 
transmission are the main focus of this paper.     
                      The paper  is  organized  as follows.    Section  2 describes a  simple  two-node 
model  of  electric  power  transmission  with  uncertain  demand  and  examines  properties  of 
long-run market equilibrium in a static setting.    Section 3 investigates how average revenue 
regulation affects transmission investment and pricing of the profit-maximizing monopolist.   
Section 4 compares welfare effects of average revenue regulation with those of a Coasian    
two-part tariff of electric power transmission.    Finally, Section 5 presents brief conclusions 
and some policy implications of the results in the paper.    The Appendix section describes the 
derivation of comparative-static results, the proof of Proposition 2, and a simple numerical 
example that illustrates the results of the paper. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
2.1 The Basic Model 
              The paper uses a stylized geographical setting to examine the effects of average 
revenue regulation in  electricity  transmission.    In  this  setting,  a  transmission  line  moves 
power from a generation node to a consumption node, as shown by Figure 1.
6    In Figure 1, n 
identical firms generate y megawatts of electricity at node G and supply x megawatts to 
consumers at node L through a single transmission line that is owned and operated by the 
regulated monopolist.
7    For simplicity, no loss in transmission is assumed and the amount of 
transmitted electricity is assumed to be equal to the amount of generated electricity, i.e., nx = 
ny.    The paper also assumes the absence of ancillary services such as voltage and frequency 
control.     
 
                              [Figure 1 here] 
 
The supply of electricity is characterized by the free entry and exit of identical    
firms operating at the minimum point of a U-shaped average cost curve in the long run.   
Integer constraints are ignored, and n is determined by the condition that generators earn zero 
profits in equilibrium.    The second-order condition for the profit maximization of generators 
is assumed to hold; that is, the marginal cost of generation is an increasing function of output.     
Congestion occurs when total demand for transmission, nx, exceeds the capacity 
of the transmission facility of the monopolist.    Congestion pricing is applied to efficiently 
ration the excess demand for transmission access.    Given congestion, firms at node G should 
pay r per megawatt of the transmitted electricity, which is defined as the difference between 
the  price  of  electricity  at  node  L  and  the  marginal cost  of  generation  at  node  G,  to  the 
transmission  monopolist.    Since  electricity  supply  is  perfectly  competitive,  the  price  of 
electricity, denoted by p, should be equal to the sum of r and the marginal generation cost in 
equilibrium.    Using congestion pricing to achieve rationing is allocatively efficient because, 
in equilibrium, consumers who are only willing to pay less than p are rationed, as are firms 
that have a marginal generation cost exceeding (p − r).     
The unit price of congestion is endogenously determined by the degree to which 
the  transmission  constraint  is  tightened  in  the  market;  that  is,  r  >  0  if  the  transmission 
constraint is binding, and r = 0 otherwise.    The profit-maximizing transmission monopolist 
chooses  the  optimal  levels  of  a  non-negative  fixed  access  fee  and  the  capacity  of  the 
transmission line, while the value of r is determined by the electricity market.    Examples of 
mechanisms that determine the value of r include an electricity market in Norway where the    
unit price of congestion is defined as an interregional difference in market clearing prices 
(Bjorndal and Jornsten, 2001). 
  The  transmission  sector  is  assumed  to  have  increasing  returns  to  scale 
technology, which implies that the transmission sector is a natural monopoly.    Total costs in 
the transmission sector, denoted by Cm, are assumed to be a function of the thermal capacity 
of the transmission line: 
 
Cm = m0 + mK                                                                                                      (1) 
       
where K denotes the thermal capacity of the transmission line owned and operated by the 
monopolist.    The parameters m0 and m are a fixed cost and the constant marginal cost of 
transmission, respectively.    To focus on the expansion of transmission capacity, the cost of 
operating the transmission line is assumed to be zero and costs in the transmission sector 
depend only on the thermal capacity.     
The monopolist can charge firms at node G a simple two-part tariff comprising a 
non-negative fixed access fee, e, and a unit price, r, which corresponds to the unit price of 
congestion.    Examples  include  the  transmission  tariff  in  Norway  where  a  variable 
congestion price and postage stamp rate are respectively applied to the unit price and fixed 
access fee (Westre, 1996; Braton, 1997).    If the fixed access fee is zero, the transmission 
tariff  consists  of  the  congestion  price  alone.    The  total  revenue  of  the  transmission    
monopolist is the sum of en and rnx.     
                        The construction of an operational transmission facility takes time.    Since the 
unit price of congestion depends on market conditions, the transmission monopolist who 
decides the thermal capacity of the line connecting nodes G and L is uncertain about what   
revenue can be earned from congestion pricing.    This paper focuses on uncertainty that only 
affects electricity demand at node L.    Causes of uncertainty in electricity demand include 
business cycles, population growth, and a saturation of durable goods. 
The demand for electricity at node L is assumed to be a function of both electricity 
price at node L and the state of the world  W Î w , and the demand function D(p, ￿) is strictly 
downward sloping in p for all values of ￿.    The set of all states of the world, ￿, can be 
divided into two subsets according to the necessity for rationing: ￿0={￿| D(p, ￿) ￿ K}, which 
includes states in which no congestion occurs, and ￿1={￿| D(p, ￿) > K}, which includes 
states in which congestion occurs.    For congestion pricing to be effective, the probability 
that congestion occurs is assumed to be strictly positive.    The variable ￿ is assumed to be a 
continuous random variable with a compact range. 
As an illustrative example, suppose that both electricity supply and demand 
curves are linear in electricity price as shown in Figure 2, and that the location of demand 
curves depends on each state of the world.    When the demand curve is described by D0, 
transmission  capacity  exceeds  the  amount  of  transmitted  electricity  and  congestion  price 
becomes zero in equilibrium.    In contrast, the rationing of transmission demand becomes    
necessary and the unit price of congestion rises to r1 in equilibrium when the demand curve is 
described by D1. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
2.2 Market Equilibrium 
  Equilibrium in the electricity market is determined by three conditions: (i) firms 
at node G earn zero profits; (ii) there is no excess demand for electricity at node L; and (iii) 
the capacity constraint on the transmission line is binding.    These conditions are represented   
by the following equations, respectively:   
 
                (p − r)y(p, r) − Cd[y(p, r)]    = e                                                                            (2) 
n y(p, r) − D(p, ￿)    = 0                                                                                        (3) 
and   
D(p, ￿)    = K,                                                                                                      (4) 
 
where y(p, r) is the supply function of each firm at node G, and Cd(y) is the cost function of 
each firm at node G.    All these functions and the demand function are assumed to be twice 
differentiable.    It is also assumed that yp ￿ (￿y/￿p) > 0, yr ￿ (￿y/￿r) < 0, yr = −yp, ￿Cd/￿y > 0, 
￿
2Cd/￿y
2 > 0, and D’ ￿ ￿D/￿p < 0.    The assumptions that yp > 0, yr < 0, and yr = −yp follow    
from the standard properties of competitive firms’ profit functions.     
                          The response of endogenous variables to changes in e and K depends on 
which  subset  of  states  occurs.    While  the  electricity  price  and  generators’  supply  are 
stochastic variables that depend on ￿, the number of generators is not stochastic and this does 
not depend on ￿.    Some comparative-static analysis is conducted to describe the response of 
the long-run equilibrium values of p, r, n, y, and nx to changes in e and K.    The results of the 
comparative-static analysis are summarized in Table 1a and Table 1b.    The derivation of the 
partial derivatives in these tables is described in Appendix A.     
 
[Table 1 here] 
   
In the states in which the constraint on the transmission line capacity is binding 
(Table 1a), holding transmission capacity constant, an increase in the access fee reduces the 
congestion price.    This is because the number of generators falls following a rise in the 
access fee.    Since dy/de = yp/y > 0, a decrease in the number of generators in response to a 
rising access fee is exactly offset by an increase in y, output of each generator.    Thus, total 
demand for transmission, nx, is not affected by a change in the access fee.    Holding the 
access fee constant, an increase in transmission capacity lowers both the electricity price and   
the congestion price by the same amount, i.e., 1/D’.    Hence, the output of each generator at 
node G is unaffected.    The equilibrium number of generators increases by 1/y due to the      
expansion of transmission capacity by one unit.    The increase in capacity by one unit results 
in a one-unit increase in total demand for transmission.                                     
In the states in which the capacity constraint of the transmission facility is 
not  binding  (Table  1b),  the  unit  price  of  congestion  is  zero  and  the  revenue  of  the 
transmission monopolist depends only on the access fee.    When there is no congestion, the 
equilibrium is determined by two conditions: that the firms at node G earn zero profits and 
that there is no excess demand for electricity at node L.    Thus, the equilibrium condition (4) 
is irrelevant for the comparative statics in states belonging to the subset ￿0.    In contrast with 
the states in which the transmission constraint is binding, an increase in the access fee raises 
the electricity price at node L in equilibrium, thereby lowering consumer surplus.    This is 
because the upward shift in the total supply curve of the firms at node G, which is due to this 
rise in the access fee, raises the electricity price along the demand curve at node L when the 
transmission constraint is not binding.    Although an increase in the access fee raises the 
supply of each generator, this additional supply is more than offset by the decrease in total 
supply associated with the fall in the number of generators due to the increased access fee.   
Thus, in equilibrium, total demand for transmission falls following an increase in the access 
fee when the transmission capacity constraint is not binding.               
 
2.3 Profit Maximization of the Unregulated Transmission Monopolist 
                          If  no  regulation  is  applied  to  the  transmission  sector,  a  transmission    
monopolist is assumed to choose the access fee and the capacity of the transmission line 
connecting nodes G and L so as to maximize its expected profits: 
 
            Max. E(￿) = E(rnx) + en − mK − m0    ,                                                                  (5)   
                      e, K 
 
where ￿ denotes the profits of the transmission monopolist.    The expected value of the 
monopolist’s  profits  in  (5)  is  assumed  sufficiently  regular  for  the  expectations  and 
differentiation operators to be interchangeable (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1976, p.224).     
The first-order condition for maximizing the expected value of the profits in 
(5) with respect to the access fee is:         
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where P0 is the probability that the capacity constraint is not binding, and   
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From (6), the optimal access fee for the profit-maximizing monopolist, denoted by em, is: 
    
















0       .                                                                                  (8) 
 
The optimal access fee for the unregulated transmission monopolist is strictly 
positive unless the probability that the capacity constraint on the transmission line becomes 
binding is unity; that is, P0 = 0.    If the capacity constraint becomes binding in all states of 
the world, the optimal access fee is zero and the revenue from congestion pricing is the sole 
source of income for the transmission monopolist.    The superiority of a uniform price over a 
two-part tariff for the profit-maximizing monopolist in case of P0 = 0 is consistent with a 
finding of Ordover and Panzar (1982) for the class of production processes in which the 
purchased input provided by the upstream monopolist is required in fixed proportion to the 
output of firms operating in the competitive downstream market.     
                                  With  respect  to  the  capacity  of  the  transmission  line,  the  first-order 
condition for maximizing the expected profits is E(￿￿/￿K) = 0, which indicates 
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where  y   indicates  the  value  of  y  for  1 W Î w .    The  left-hand  side  of  (9)  implies  the 
expected  marginal  revenue  associated  with  transmission  capacity.    For  the    
profit-maximizing monopolist, the optimal capacity and access fee satisfy both (8) and (9).   
The second-order conditions, which indicate the strict concavity of the profit function of the 
monopolist, are assumed to hold for the expected profits of the transmission monopolist to be 
maximized;  that  is,  E(￿
2￿/￿e
2)  <  0,  E(￿
2￿/￿K




2)  > 
[E(￿
2￿/￿e￿K)]
2 .     
 
3. Effects of Average Revenue Regulation 
                  We investigate the effects of average revenue regulation based on the 
comparative-static  analysis  in  Section  2.2.    The  transmission  monopolist  is  assumed  to 
maximize its expected profits subject to a constraint on its expected average revenue.
8    The 
profit-maximizing  transmission  monopolist  subject  to  average  revenue  regulation  faces  a 
trade-off between the revenue from the access fee and that from the congestion price.    Under 
average revenue regulation, the regulator imposes a constraint on average charges of the 
transmission  monopolist,  which  are  defined  as  total  revenue  divided  by  total  output.     
Average revenue regulation has an informational advantage over the price-cap regulation of 
Vogelsang (2001) in which the regulator needs to find weights that best approximate idealized 
price-cap weights. 
    The following Lagrange function is defined:                 
 
            L = ( 1 − ￿a)[E(rnx) + en] − mK − m0 + ￿aRE(nx),                                                (10)      
 
where ￿a is a Lagrange multiplier with respect to a constraint on the expected average revenue 
of the transmission monopolist.
9    The constraint is: 
 
                                  E(rnx) + en ￿ RE(nx)                                                                        (11) 
 
where R is a cap on the expected average revenue of the transmission monopolist.    It is 
assumed that 0 < ￿a < 1 for the second-order condition of profit maximization to hold under 
the binding constraint on average revenue (Cowan, 1997, p.78).    For the expected profits of 
the transmission monopolist to be non-negative, the cap on the expected average revenue 
should at least exceed the marginal capacity cost.    Thus, it is assumed that R > m.       
The  first-order  condition  for  maximizing  the  expected  profits  of  the 
regulated transmission monopolist with respect to the access fee is:       
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where ￿ ￿ ￿a/(1−￿a) ￿ 0.    From (12), the optimal access fee under the binding constraint on 
the expected average revenue, denoted by ea, is: 











































ea   ,     
ea = 0, otherwise.                                                                                                  (13) 
 
Except for the case where P0 = 0, the optimal access fee for the monopolist under the binding 
constraint on the expected average revenue is lower than that for the unregulated monopolist; 
that is, ea < em.    If P0 = 0, the optimal access fee becomes zero for both the unregulated and 
regulated  monopolist  in  the  transmission  sector.      These  results  are  summarized  by  the 
following proposition associated with the effects of average revenue regulation on the access 
fee: 
 
PROPOSITION 1.      Unless the probability that transmission congestion occurs becomes 
unity, in equilibrium, the binding constraint on the expected average revenue of the profit 
maximizing  transmission  monopolist  lowers  the  access  fee.    If  the  probability  that 
transmission congestion occurs becomes unity, in equilibrium, the access fee is not affected 
by  the  binding  constraint  on  the  expected  average  revenue  of  the  profit  maximizing 
transmission monopolist. 
 
PROOF.    If P0 > 0, the access fee chosen by the profit-maximizing transmission monopolist 
subject to no regulation is given by (8), which exceeds the optimal access fee subject to    
average revenue regulation in (9), because ￿RE(–D’/y|￿0) > 0.    If P0 = 0, the optimal access 
fee  becomes  zero  for  both  the  case  of  no  regulation  and  the  case  of  average  revenue 
regulation.     
Q.E.D.   
 
                              The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward.    Uncertainty about 
electricity demand at node L leads to the possibility that the capacity constraint is not binding   
and no revenue is earned from congestion pricing.    To cover this loss in revenue, the access 
fee must be strictly positive if the expected value of the transmission monopolist’s profits is 
maximized.    Average revenue regulation, if binding, forces the transmission monopolist to 
lower the access fee.    If the capacity constraint is binding in all states of the world (i.e., 
P0=0), however, congestion pricing alone is sufficient and an access fee is not necessary for 
the transmission monopolist.   
                      With respect to the capacity of the transmission facility, the necessary condition 
for maximizing the expected profits is E(￿L/￿K) = 0, which indicates 
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Equation  (14)  implies  that  the  monopolist’s  expected  marginal  revenue  with  respect  to    
transmission capacity must deviate from its marginal cost at the optimum as long as the 
constraint on its expected average revenue is binding.    The term on the left-hand side of (14) 
implies the expectation of the monopolist’s marginal revenue with respect to transmission 
capacity under no binding constraint on its expected average revenue, which corresponds to 
the left-hand side of (9).     
The right-hand side of (14) implies the effective marginal cost of capacity for the 
transmission monopolist subject to average revenue regulation.    Equation (14) implies that 
whether the binding constraint on average revenue raises or lowers transmission capacity 
depends on the sign of the term (1−P0)R − m.    Because of the assumption that E(￿
2￿/￿K
2) < 
0, the expected marginal revenue curve with respect to capacity is downward sloping, as in 
the standard model of monopoly profit maximization.    Thus, the binding constraint on the 
expected average revenue reduces the effective marginal cost of capacity, thereby raising the 
optimal capacity of the transmission line, if and only if the term (1−P0)R − m is strictly 
positive.     
The  effect  of  average  revenue  regulation  on  transmission  capacity,  which  is 
indicated by the second term on the right-hand side of (14), is summarized in the following 
proposition: 
   
PROPOSITION  2.      The  binding  constraint  on  the  expected  average  revenue  of  the 
monopolist raises the capacity of its transmission line.    
 
PROOF.      See Appendix B. 
 
Proposition 2 immediately leads to the following condition associated with the choice of a 
cap on the expected average revenue: 
 
(1−P0)R − m > 0.                                                                                    (15)       
 
The increase in transmission capacity promotes electricity trade between the 
generators’ node and the consumers’ node.    As a result, one expects the electricity price to 
fall.    Indeed, the following corollary indicates that average revenue regulation, if binding, 
contributes to the improvement of the expected consumer surplus through the lower access 
fee and the higher transmission capacity: 
 
COROLLARY  1.    The  binding  constraint  on  the  expected  average  revenue  of  the 
transmission monopolist increases the expected consumer surplus. 
 
PROOF.    Differentiating the expected consumer surplus with respect to the access fee and 
the transmission capacity respectively, and substituting ￿p/￿e and ￿p/￿K in Tables 1a and 
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From Propositions 1 and 2, the above inequalities indicate that the binding constraint on the 
expected  average  revenue  of  the  transmission  monopolist  raises  the  expected  consumer 
surplus.               
                                                                                                        Q.E.D. 
 
On the K-e plane, the slope of the iso-average revenue contour corresponds to the 
marginal rate of substitution of K for e under the constant expected average revenue if P0 > 0.   
Totally differentiating (11) with equality and substituting the first-order conditions (13) and 























a     .                                                              (16) 
 
where Ka is the optimal capacity of the transmission facility for the monopolist under the    
binding  constraint  on  its  expected  average  revenue.    From  (15),  the  nominator  on  the 
right-hand side of (16) is strictly positive.    Thus, if P0 > 0, the marginal rate of substitution 
of K for e becomes strictly positive at the optimum for the transmission monopolist subject to 
average revenue regulation.     
 
4. WELFARE COMPARISON BETWEEN AVERAGE REVENUE REGULATION AND A 
COASIAN TWO-PART TARIFF 
        As an alternative form of regulating transmission pricing, the regulator is 
supposed to choose the access fee and the transmission capacity that result in zero profits of 
the transmission monopolist.    This form of regulation shares a feature of zero profits of the 
transmission monopolist with cost-of-service regulation that has been traditionally applied to 
a  transmission  sector.
10    A  policy  question  of  interest  is  whether  social  welfare  under 
average revenue regulation is higher than that under cost-of-service regulation when R is set 
equal  to  the  expected  average  revenue  earned  by  the  monopolist  under  cost-of-service 
regulation.    Assuming  a  Coasian  two-part  tariff  as  an  efficient  form  of  regulating 
transmission investment and pricing on a cost-of-service basis, this section examines welfare 
properties of average revenue regulation with a cap equal to the expected average revenue 
earned by the monopolist under the Coasian two-part tariff.
11         
A measure for social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and profits 
of the transmission monopolist in the long run:              
 
0 ) , ( m mK en rnx dq q D W
p - - + + =￿ w             .                            (17) 
 
where W is a measure for social welfare.    Note that, by assumption, since generators at node 
G earn zero profits, their profits are excluded from the right-hand side of (17). 
 
4.1 Case 1: P0 = 0 
If P0 = 0, the optimal access fee must be zero in both the case of unregulated 
monopolist’s  profit  maximization  and  the  case  of  regulated  monopolist’s  profit 
maximization.
12    As a Coasian two-part tariff, the regulator is supposed to set the access fee 
equal to the fixed cost per firm and determines the capacity of the transmission line so as to 
make the expected total revenue from congestion pricing equal to mK:     
 
E(nx)R0    =    m0 + mK0 ,                                                                                    (18) 
e0   = m0/n,                                                                                                          (19) 
and   
K0 = E(rnx)/m ,                                                                                                  (20)   
 
where R0 is the expected average revenue, e0 is the access fee, and K0 is the transmission 
capacity  under  a  Coasian  two-part  tariff,  respectively.
13    In  the  case  where  P0 =  0,  (20)    
indicates the first-order condition with respect to transmission capacity for maximizing the 
expected value of social welfare in (17), because E(rnx) = E(r|￿1)K0.    The expected price of 
congestion is equal to the marginal capacity cost of the transmission line in (20).    Thus, the 
Coasian two-part tariff defined in (19) and (20) satisfies both the first-order condition for 
welfare  maximization  with  respect  to  capacity  ((1  −  P0)E(r|￿1)  =  m)  and  a  zero-profit 
constraint on the transmission monopolist.     
                      The  Coasian  two-part  tariff  comprising  e0  and  K0  results  in  a  higher 
transmission capacity than average revenue regulation with R = R0.    This is because E(r|￿1) 
= R > m under average revenue regulation.    In comparison to the Coasian two-part tariff, 
average revenue regulation with R = R0 reduces consumer surplus through a lower capacity, 
in spite of a lower access fee, which does not affect consumer surplus as long as congestion 
occurs.   
  The  expected  profits  of  the  transmission  monopolist  become  negative 
under average revenue regulation with R = R0, because from (18) 
 
                R0E(nx) −    m0   −    mKa    =    [(mK0 + m0 )/K0]Ka   −    m0   −    mKa   
=    m0(Ka −K0)/K0    <    0. 
 
Thus, if P0 = 0, the expected social welfare under the Coasian two-part tariff satisfying (19) 
and (20) is larger than that under average revenue regulation with R = R0, which is not    
feasible in terms of the viability of the transmission sector. 
 
4.2 Case 2: P0 > 0 
If P0 > 0, the optimal access fee becomes either zero or positive under average 
revenue regulation.    For a welfare comparison, suppose that R is set equal to the expected 
average revenue R0 in (18).    If P0 > 0, a welfare comparison depends on whether the number 
of generators at node G is larger than the term ￿RE[−D’/y|￿0] in (13). 
          From (13), ea = 0 if P0 > 0 and n < ￿RE[−D’/y|￿0].    Thus, an iso-average revenue 
contour intersects an iso-profit contour on the K axis at the optimum, as shown by point A in 
Figure 3.
14    At A, the iso-profit contour ￿1 that is centered around the unregulated monopoly 
optimum intersects the iso-average revenue contour with R = R0, which is shown by the 
dotted line in the figure.    The iso-welfare contour that passes through A is denoted by W1 in 
the figure.    For all iso-welfare contours that are centered around the welfare optimum, the 
following equation applies: 
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Note that the access fee is zero at the optimum of welfare maximization.    At A, the slope of    
the iso-average revenue contour with R = R0 is less steep than that of the iso-profit contour ￿1, 
because otherwise ea > 0.    Point C represents the combination of K0 and e0, and C is to the 
right of A.    The iso-profit contour ￿0, which is the locus of K and e that require profits equal 
to zero, intersects the iso-average revenue contour with R = R0 at C.    Since ￿1 is located 
closer to the unregulated monopoly optimum than ￿0, the expected profits of the monopolist 
under  average  revenue  regulation  with  R  =  R0  are  strictly  positive  and  higher  than  the 
expected profits under the Coasian two-part tariff, which become zero.     
 




(1 − P0)R0   =    (1 − P0)[(1 − P0)E(r|￿1)Ka/E(nx)]    >    m .                            (22) 
 
Rearranging terms in (22) yields 
 
      (1 − P0)E(r|￿1)    >    mE(nx)/[Ka (1 − P0)]    =    m{1 + [P0/(1 − P0)][E(nx|￿0)/Ka]}    > m. 
(23) 
 
Inequality  (23)  implies  that  the  expected  price  of  congestion  under  average  revenue    
regulation  with  R  =  R0  exceeds  the  marginal  capacity  cost,  while  the  expected  price  of 
congestion is equal to the marginal capacity cost under the Coasian two-part tariff satisfying 
(19)  and  (20).    Thus,  in  comparison  to  the  Coasian  two-part  tariff,  average  revenue 
regulation with R = R0 results in the lower capacity of the transmission facility.    Average 
revenue regulation leads to a decrease (an increase) in expected consumer surplus if the 
reduction of consumer surplus caused by a lower capacity is more (less) than the rise in 
consumer surplus caused by a lower access fee.     
Whether the expected social welfare under average revenue regulation with   
R = R0 is larger than that under the Coasian tariff satisfying (19) and (20) is not unambiguous 
for the case where P0 > 0 and n < ￿RE[−D’/y|￿0].    Figure 3 illustrates a case where the 
expected welfare under average revenue regulation with R = R0 is higher than that under the 
Coasian  two-part tariff.    In  this  figure, the  welfare optimum  is  closer to  the iso-welfare 
contour W1, which passes through A, than the iso-welfare contour W2, which passes through 
C.     
                          If P0 > 0 and n ￿ ￿RE[−D’/y|￿0], an iso-average revenue contour is tangent 
to an iso-profit contour at the optimum.    Point A in Figure 4 indicates the optimum under 
average  revenue  regulation  with  R  =  R0.    The  iso-profit  contour  that  passes  through  A, 
denoted by ￿1, is located closer to the unregulated monopoly optimum than the zero-profit 
contour ￿0, and the expected profits of the monopolist under average revenue regulation with 
R = R0 are strictly positive and higher than the expected profits under the Coasian two-part    
tariff, which become zero.    Point C, where the iso-average revenue contour with R = R0 
intersects the zero-profit contour, is either to the right or to the left of point A.    Figure 4 
illustrates a case where C is to the right of A, and the slope of the iso-welfare contour W1 at A 
is less steep than the slope of the iso-average revenue contour with R = R0 at A.    If C is to the 
right of A, K0 > Ka and e0 > ea. 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
      The slope of the iso-welfare contour at A is derived by substituting the 
first-order conditions in (13) and (14) into de/dK|const.welfare in (21):           
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From (16) and (24), the following equation holds at A: 
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(25) 
    
In the case where P0 > 0 and n ￿ ￿RE[−D’/y|￿0], the denominator on the 
right-hand side of (25) is strictly negative.    Thus, if the nominator on the right-hand side of 
(25) is strictly negative at A, dea/dKa > de/dK|const.welfare , and the expected social welfare under 
average revenue regulation with R = R0 is larger than that under the Coasian two-part tariff in 
the case where 0 < ea < e0.    The negative nominator on the right-hand side of (21) indicates       
 






























R P     .                                        (26)     
 
Since  y   > y, the denominator on the right-hand side of (26) is strictly negative for any 
linear demand function, which exhibits the constant value of D’ in all states of the world.     
Inequality (26) also holds if the demand function in question has a constant price elasticity.
15   
Thus, if 0 < ea < e0, the expected social welfare under average revenue regulation with R = R0 
is larger than that under the Coasian two-part tariff satisfying (19) and (20) for any linear or 
log-linear demand function.
16     
Appendix C presents a numerical example in which a two-part tariff for 
transmission demand under average revenue regulation with R = R0 leads to a higher social 
welfare than the Coasian two-part tariff satisfying (19) and (20) for a relevant rage of fixed 
costs of the transmission line connecting nodes G and L.    In this example, if R = R0 = 2.95, 
which corresponds to m0 = 20, the optimal access fee is zero under average revenue regulation    
and both transmission capacity and expected consumer surplus are lower than those under the 
Coasian two-part tariff.    Average revenue regulation with R = 2.95, however, results in the 
expected profits of the monopolist and social welfare that are higher than those under the 
Coasian two-part tariff with R0 = 2.95.    If R = R0 = 6.35, which corresponds to m0 = 45, the 
optimal access fee under average revenue regulation is positive and smaller than that under 
the Coasian two-part tariff.    Thus, average revenue regulation with R = 6.35 results in a 
larger social welfare in comparison to the Coasian two-part tariff with R0 = 6.35.                                             
 
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Assuming  that  an  independent  electricity  transmission  monopolist  applies  a 
two-part tariff comprising a variable congestion price and a fixed non-negative access fee, 
this paper examines the long-run effects of constraining the expected average revenue of the 
profit  maximizing  transmission  monopolist  on  its  choice  of  transmission  investment  and 
pricing.    In  comparison  to  unregulated  monopoly  profit  maximization,  average  revenue 
regulation lowers the access fee unless the probability that congestion occurs becomes unity.   
Average revenue regulation raises transmission capacity and improves expected consumer 
surplus in comparison to unregulated monopoly profit maximization.    This finding excludes 
the possibility, from a welfare viewpoint, that average revenue regulation is worse than no 
regulation, which has been a concern about average revenue regulation (Cowan, 1997). 
The superiority of a two-part tariff over a uniform price may hold under average    
revenue regulation if the probability that congestion occurs becomes less than unity.      This 
finding  contrasts  with  that  of  Ordover  and  Panzar  (1982),  who  argue  that  for  the  input 
required in fixed proportion to output such as electric power transmission, a two-part tariff is 
inferior to a uniform price in the presence of increasing returns to scale technology from 
either a welfare or monopoly profit-maximizing standpoint.    They also argue that a two-part 
tariff cannot be justified in transmission pricing.    On the contrary, this paper shows that a 
two-part tariff can be more desirable than a uniform price and that the policy of applying a 
two-part tariff to transmission pricing, which has been implemented in many countries, is 
justified with average revenue regulation .               
The finding that average revenue regulation can achieve higher welfare than a 
Coasian  two-part  tariff  indicates  that  the  application  of  average  revenue  regulation  to 
transmission  pricing  may  lead  to  a  substantial  improvement  in  economic  efficiency.    A 
Coasian two-part tariff, in which the unit price is set equal to marginal cost and all profits are 
extracted  via  the  access  fee,  is  the  most  efficient  form  of  cost-of-service  regulation.   
However,  even  in  comparison  to  this  ‘best’  form  of  cost-of-service  regulation,  average 
revenue regulation can achieve a higher welfare and be more allocatively efficient.    Thus, 
average revenue regulation is expected to achieve a significant gain of allocative efficiency in 
comparison  to  traditional  cost-of-service  regulation,  which  has  been  applied  to  the 
transmission sector in many countries.    Since average revenue regulation, which provides a 
transmission monopolist with an incentive to reduce costs, is more efficient in production    
than  cost-of-service  regulation,  average  revenue  regulation  can  be  a  promising  policy 
alternative that results in a substantial improvement of economic efficiency.           
For  average  revenue  regulation  to  be  allocatively  efficient,  however,  the 
regulator must consider the probability that congestion occurs, the level of the access fee, and 
the demand structure of electricity.    The occurrence of congestion in transmission networks 
is crucial, because if transmission congestion frequently occurs, the fixed fee may not be 
necessary  for  the  transmission  monopolist  who  can  completely  cover  investment  costs 
through the revenue from congestion pricing alone.    In the case where a transmission line in 
question is always constrained, average revenue regulation may result in an efficiency loss in 
comparison to cost-of-service regulation.     
From a welfare viewpoint, the superiority of average revenue regulation over 
cost-of-service regulation may not hold when the high access fee discourages the entry of 
generators,  thereby  raising  electricity  prices  and  reducing  consumer  surplus.    Average 
revenue regulation can be allocatively more efficient than cost-of-service regulation in the 
case where average revenue regulation results in a lower access fee and capacity level than 
cost-of-service  regulation.    Average  revenue  regulation  with  a  low  access  fee  is  also 
appropriate from the viewpoint of competition policy because a lower access fee induces 
more competition in electricity markets.     
The demand structure of electricity also affects the welfare advantage of average 
revenue  regulation  over  cost-of-service  regulation.    The  finding  that  for  any  linear  or    
log-linear demand function the expected social welfare under average revenue regulation can 
be larger than that under the Coasian two-part tariff implies the necessity of investigating the 
demand structure of electricity prior to the choice of a regulatory scheme for transmission 
pricing.    A  demand  function  of  electricity  is  often  approximated  by  either  a  linear  or  a 
log-linear form in the policy analysis of electricity markets.
17      If electricity demand is well 
described  by  either  a  linear  or a  log-linear  function  of  electricity  price,  average  revenue 
regulation has the potential to improve allocative efficiency in comparison to cost-of-service 
regulation.                 
 
NOTES 
1.    For  simplicity,  this  paper  assumes  that  transmission  capacity  can  be  continuously 
expanded.    In practice, however, transmission investments are lumpy and the equality of the 
marginal benefit with the marginal cost of transmission does not necessarily hold (Leautier, 
2000).   
 
2.    The  paper  assumes  an  independent  transmission  company  that  does  transmission 
investment, maintains the system, bears the costs, and collects the revenues, which is refereed 
to as a ‘Transco’ model (Vogelsang, 2001; Joskow and Tirole, 2003).    An alternative to the 
Transco  model,  which  is  referred  to  as  a  ‘merchant  transmission’  model,  is  based  on 
decentralized  property  rights  for  the  merchant  investors,  and  relies  on  competitive,    
market-driven transmission investment.     
 
3.    An alternative to a two-part tariff is Ramsey pricing, which can be inferior to a two-part 
tariff in the presence of significant economies of scale (Vogelsang, 2001, p.144).    A two-part 
tariff  has  been  often  applied  to  transmission  pricing  in  practice.    For  the  practice  of 
transmission pricing in various countries, see Green (1997), for instance.    Deng and Oren 
(2001) investigate a complex form of non-linear pricing of transmission.     
 
4.    The paper does not consider a real options approach to transmission investment, which is 
investigated by Martzoukos and Teplitz-Sembitzky (1992), and Saphores et al. (2004).     
 
5.    The effects of imperfect competition on congestion pricing and the fixed access fee are 
investigated by Matsukawa (2005) in a more general setting.     
 
6.    An interpretation of this setting is that generation costs at node L are large enough to 
make the location of generation plants at L not viable over a relevant range of production.   
This simple model ignores loop flow, which lets power flows on one line raise or decrease the 
capacity of other lines.     
                         
7.    To focus on the effects of regulation on both the investment and pricing of electricity    
transmission, the paper does not consider generators’ choice of where to site their plants, 
which is analyzed by Hogendorn (2003).    Hogendorn (2003) does not investigate the choice 
of a transmission tariff, assuming that the independent transmission company and generators 
make investment decisions under an exogenous price of transmission.     
 
8.    An  alternative  form  of  regulating  transmission pricing  is to cap a  monopolist’s total 
revenue, which has been adopted in Norway, Australia and the United Kingdom (Makholm et 
al., 2000).    If the expected total revenue is capped in the model of this paper, the optimal 
access fee under the total revenue constraint becomes the same as em in (8) and the optimal 
capacity  becomes  less  than  that  satisfying  (9).    Thus,  in  the  model  of  this  paper,  total 
revenue regulation is worse than no regulation from a welfare point of view.    In the model of 
this  paper,  a  profit-maximizing  transmission  monopolist  subject  to  average  revenue 
regulation  faces  a  trade-off  between  the  revenue  from  the  access  fee  and  that  from  the 
congestion  price,  while  the  monopolist  subject  to  a  total  revenue  constraint  would  only 
change its transmission capacity to maximize the expected profits. 
 
9.    This formula for average revenue regulation follows Armstrong and Vickers (1991), and 
Cowan (1997). 
 
10.    Rate-of-return regulation, which allows a transmission company to earn a fair return on    
its investment, is a familiar form of regulating transmission pricing on a cost-of-service basis.       
 
11.    This paper does not consider the effect of regulation on productive efficiency.    If the 
regulator cannot observe the monopolist’s efforts in reducing investment costs, a Coasian 
two-part tariff satisfying (19) and (20) may lead to a loss of productive efficiency, because the 
monopolist does not have an incentive to lower cost parameters m0 and m.    Average revenue 
regulation is expected to achieve a higher efficiency of production than the Coasian two-part 
tariff, because the monopolist subject to average revenue regulation can increase its profits by 
reducing cost parameters m0 and m.       
 
12.    If P0 = 0, uniform pricing with a zero-profit constraint can be an alternative form of 
regulation for welfare comparison.    This form of regulation sets the access fee equal to zero 
and  leads  to  transmission  capacity  that  results  in  zero  profits.    If  R  is  set  equal  to  the 
expected  average  revenue  earned  by  the  monopolist  under  the  uniform  pricing  with  a 
zero-profit  constraint,  the  capacity  of  the  transmission  line  under  the  average  revenue 
regulation is the same as that under uniform pricing with a zero-profit constraint.    Thus, 
average revenue regulation results in the same level of the expected social welfare as that 
under uniform pricing with a zero-profit constraint.               
 
13.    Traditional  cost-of-service  regulation  usually  sets  e  equal  to  the  embedded  cost  of    
transmission as in postage stamp rates, and transmission capacity is not directly regulated.   
The  regulator  can  affect  the  monopolist’s  choice  of  transmission  investment  through  a 
regulatory process of examining transmission investment planning.    Congestion pricing is 
not  applied  to  traditional  cost-of-service  regulation.    For  welfare  comparison,  however, 
congestion pricing is assumed to be applied to the transmission sector and the regulator is 
assumed to be able to determine both the access fee and the transmission capacity so as to 
make  the  monopolist’s  profits  zero  when  a  Coasian  two-part  tariff  is  applied  to  the 
transmission sector. 
 
14.    At the optimum for a profit-maximizing monopolist under a binding constraint on its 
expected average revenue, the iso-average revenue contour must be upward sloping because 
of the condition in (15).    At this optimum, the iso-average revenue contour must be convex 
to  the  origin.    The  convexity  of  the  iso-average  revenue  contour,  which  is  proved  by  a 
positive value of the differentiation of de/dK for constant R with respect to K, is also found in 
Armstrong and Vickers (1991), and Cowan(1997).   
 
15.    The denominator on the right-hand side of (26) is 1 − E(p/￿|￿1)E(￿/p|￿0) where ￿ is the 
price elasticity of electricity demand.    Thus, if the electricity demand function is log-linear 
in electricity price, the denominator on the right-hand side of (26) is strictly negative. 
    
16.    In  the  case  where  ea  >  e0,  for  the  expected  social  welfare  under  average  revenue 
regulation with R = R0 to be larger than that under the Coasian two-part tariff, dea/dKa must 
be less than de/dK|const.welfare .    If dea/dKa < de/dK|const.welfare , the left-hand side of (26) must be 
less than the right-hand side of (26).    Thus, in the case where ea > e0, the expected social 
welfare under average revenue regulation with R = R0 is smaller than that under the Coasian 
two-part tariff if the demand function for electricity is either linear or log-linear.     
 
17.    See, for instance, Green and Newbery (1992) who assume a linear demand function in 
the evaluation of alternative scenarios for deregulating the United Kingdom wholesale market 
of electricity. 
 
APPENDIX A:    Derivation of the Partial Derivatives in Table 1 
To see the response of the electricity price to a change in the access fee when 







.                                                                                                      (A1) 
 
Then,  totally  differentiating  (2),  and  substituting  (A1)  and  the  first-order  condition  for 
generators’ profit maximization yields   
 






    .                                                                                                (A2)    
 
Equations (A1) and (A2) lead to the response of firm supply to the access fee: 
 







  ,                                                                                      (A3) 
 
where  yp  ￿  ￿y/￿p.    Note  that  ￿y/￿r  =  −(￿y/￿p)  for  perfectly  competitive  supply  if 
transmission  demand  is  equal  to  the  supply  of  electricity,  i.e.,  nx  =  ny.    Finally,  totally 
differentiating (3), and substituting (A1) and (A2) yields 
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                As  for  the  response  of  the  electricity  price  to  a  change  in  the  capacity  of  the 
transmission facility, total differentiation of (4) yields 
 








      .                                                                                          (A6) 
 
Then, totally differentiating (2) and substituting (A6) yields   
 








      ,                                                                                  (A7)    
 
Equations (A6) and (A7) lead to the response of firm supply to a change in transmission 
capacity: 
 





  .                                                                                                    (A8) 
 
Finally, totally differentiating (3), and substituting (A6) and (A7) yields 
 







    ,                                                                                          (A9) 
and 
 






      .                                                                                      (A10) 
 
                    Since the unit price of congestion must be zero in the states in which the capacity 
constraint is not binding, firm supply is the function of the electricity price, and a change in 
the capacity of the transmission facility does not affect endogenous variables in these states.   
Total differentiation of (2) yields   
 






      ,                                                                                                  (A11) 
 
and 
    







    .                                                                                              (A12) 
 
Totally differentiating (3) and substituting (A11) and (A12) yields 
 





















  .                                                                                          (A14) 
 
APPENDIX B:    Proof of Proposition 2 
If  ea >  0,  totally  differentiating  E(￿)  in  (5)  and  substituting  the  first-order 
conditions (13) and (14) yields 
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where E(￿a) is the expected profits of the transmission monopolist subject to average revenue 
regulation at the optimum.    Differentiating (A15) with respect to R and rearranging terms 
yields    
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Substituting (16) into (A16) yields   
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In  (A17),  the  left-hand  side  must  be  strictly  positive,  because  at  the  optimum  for  the   
transmission monopolist subject to average revenue regulation,   
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                                                                                                                                            (A18) 
 
From (A17) and (A18), dKa/dR < 0 if ea > 0 and the constraint on the expected average 
revenue of the transmission monopolist is binding (￿ > 0) .     
                            If ea = 0, totally differentiating E(￿) in (5) and substituting the first-order 
condition (12) and ea = 0 yields    
 
                          [ ] m R P dK dE a a + - - L = P ) 1 ( ) ( 0                                         (A19) 
 
Differentiating (A19) with respect to R and rearranging terms yields 
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P
                                                                  (A20) 
 
From (A18) and (A20), dKa/dR < 0 if ea = 0 and the constraint on the expected average 
revenue of the transmission monopolist is binding.    Thus, for ea ￿ 0, the binding constraint 
on the expected average revenue of the monopolist increases its transmission capacity in 
equilibrium.       
                                                                                                                                        Q.E.D. 
 
APPENDIX C: A Numerical Example 
                    Using a simple numerical example, this appendix section illustrates a case where 
a demand function of electricity is linear and the positive optimal access fee under average 
revenue regulation with R = R0 is lower than that under a Coasian two-part tariff satisfying 
(19) and (20) so that expected social welfare under average revenue regulation is larger than 
that under a Coasian two-part tariff.    The optimal solutions are computed and compared 
between  average  revenue  regulation  with  R  =  R0 and  the  Coasian  two-part  tariff.    The    
optimal solutions are also computed for the expected welfare maximization and unregulated 
monopolist’s profit maximization as a reference.   
          The demand function D(p, ￿) at node L is assumed to be linear and take the 
following form: 
 
                      D(p, ￿)    =    20    −    p    +    ￿        .                                                      (A21)   
 
A  stochastic  variable  ￿  is  assumed  to  be  uniform  and  distribute  on  [0,  20].    Thus,  the 
probability that each state occurs is given by 0.05.    The cost function of each firm at node G 
is assumed to be linear and take the following form: 
 
                      Cd    =    5 + 10y
2    .                                                                                    (A22)   
 
Then, the marginal cost of generation is given by 20y and the firm supply function becomes 
 
                        y(p, r)    =    (p − r)/20    .                                                                        (A23) 
 
Finally, the cost function of the transmission sector is assumed to be   
 
Cm = m0 + 1.25K                                                                                            (A24)    
 
where the fixed cost m0 is assumed to vary from 16 to 46.    Since the fixed costs less than 16 
violate  a  condition  for  effective  regulation  in  (15),  these  values  are  not  assumed  in 
computation.    The  fixed  costs  exceeding  46  are  also  out  of  consideration,  because  the 
Coasian two-part tariff is not feasible for these values of fixed costs.       
                  Based on these functional forms in (A21)-(A24), the optimal values for profit 
maximization under the binding constraint on the expected average revenue are obtained by 
simultaneously solving (2), (3), (4), (11) with equality, (13) and (14).    The value of R0 is 
obtained from the Coasian two-part tariff, which is computed by simultaneously solving (2), 
(3),  (4),  (18),  (19)  and  (20).    A  Gauss-Newton  method  is  used  to  solve  these 
simultaneous-equation systems.     
 
[Table 2 here]     
 
                  Table 2 summarizes computation results of key variables for the expected profit 
maximization  under  the  binding  constraint  on  the  expected  average  revenue.    For 
comparison,  the  results  of  unregulated  monopoly  profit  maximization  and  welfare 
maximization are also presented in the table.    The variable CS is consumer surplus, and R is 
the expected average revenue.    For any relevant value of the fixed costs, the probability that 
no congestion occurs becomes strictly positive (P0 > 0) under all objective functions, and the    
optimal  access  fee  under  average  revenue  regulation  is  lower  than  that  under  a  Coasian 
two-part tariff (e0 > ea). 
                    For the identical value of the expected average revenue, both the capacity of the 
transmission facility and the access fee under the Coasian two-part tariff are larger than those 
under average revenue regulation in Table 2.    Average revenue regulation leads to a higher 
price of congestion but a larger number of firms at node G than the Coasian two-part tariff.   
Average revenue regulation results in higher expected welfare than the Coasian two-part tariff.   
In fact, for any relevant value of the expected average revenue, the expected welfare under 
average  revenue  regulation  is  higher  than  that  under  the  Coasian  two-part  tariff  in  this 
numerical example.     
This numerical example shows that if the demand function of electricity is linear 
and a positive access fee under average revenue regulation with R = R0 is lower than that 
under a Coasian two-part tariff satisfying (19) and (20), average revenue regulation performs 
better than a Coasian two-part tariff from the viewpoint of social welfare.    If ea = 0, from the 
viewpoint of consumer surplus, average revenue regulation can be worse than a Coasian 
two-part tariff, as shown by the case of R = 2.95.               
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Table 1. Effects of the access fee and transmission capacity on key endogenous variables   
(directions of changes are indicated by signs in parentheses) 
 
a: States in which congestion occurs   
￿p/￿e  ￿r/￿e  ￿y/￿e  ￿n/￿e  ￿(nx)/￿e 
0  −1/y   
  (−) 
  yp/y     
  (+) 
−n yp/y
2   
(−) 
          0 
 
    (continued) 
￿p/￿K  ￿r/￿K  ￿y/￿K  ￿n/￿K  ￿(nx)/￿K 
1/D’     
(−) 
1/D’     
(−) 
          0      1/y     
    (+) 





b: States in which no congestion occurs 
￿p/￿e  ￿y/￿e  ￿n/￿e  ￿(nx) /￿e 
1/y 
(+) 
  yp/y     
      (+) 
(D’−n yp)/y
2   
(−) 
      D’/y 





















Table 2.    Optimal values of key variables under alternative objective functions 










0.86  22.2  5.06  9.1  8.1  0.71  2.4  30.4  82.8  8.01 
Average 
revenue: 
m0 = 45 
 
0.77  20.3  4.91  12.5  10.0  0.70  1.0  46.9  95.7  6.35 
Coasian 
tariff: 
m0 = 45 
 
0.98  20.9  1.25  9.3  10.5  0.35  4.8  42.8  87.8  6.35 
Average 
revenue:   
m0 = 20 
 
0.70  16.8  2.72  18.8  14.3  0.52  0  88.6  109.6  2.95 
Coasian 
tariff: 
m0 = 20 
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Figure 2. Congestion pricing with demand uncertainty:   
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Figure 3.    Welfare comparison between average revenue regulation and 
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Figure 4. Welfare comparison between average revenue regulation and 
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